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Defective Intervention Effects, Die!
Martin Atkinson
The purpose of this discussion is to seek to clarify a number of issues surrounding the
Minimal Link Condition (MLC) of Chomsky (1995) in the context of the innovations
introduced in Chomsky (1998, 1999). More challengingly, it examines critically a set of
observations that Chomsky has used to establish the importance of defective intervention
effects in syntactic computation, and argues that modifications in Chomsky’s assumptions that
are more or less independently justified obviate the need to recognise such phenomena. It is
proposed that from a conceptual perspective, this is an unqualified good thing! Defective
intervention effects require us to suppose that deleted syntactic objects can enjoy an afterlife,
whereby they can continue to effect syntactic processes after their demise. Furthermore, it
appears necessary to suppose that in certain circumstances, the demise is genuine, with
deleted objects being totally inert for the functioning of subsequent syntactic operations. This
requires Chomsky to explore conditions governing the annulment of defective intervention
effects. As a consequence, two stages of explanation become necessary to account for why a
deleted object behaves in a manner we might expect: a first stage, offering reasons for why it
might not behave in this manner, and a second stage proposing an account of why these
reasons are not operative in particular cases.
The modifications proposed are, I will suggest, consistent with the fundamental
principles underlying the Minimalist Program, a matter of some importance, as I do not intend
what follows to be seen as attempting to undermine this approach to syntactic theory.
Accordingly, the paper should be read as concerned, first and foremost, as an attempt to
sketch an alternative implementation of minimalist ideas.
The strategy pursued throughout is explicitly limited to consideration of examples utilised by
Chomsky (1998, 1999). For these examples, I have attempted to work with the assumptions
that Chomsky himself relies on, seeking to assess the detailed consequences of these
assumptions for the examples in question. In so far as what emerge as weaknesses lead me to
suggest modifications, I have not attempted to justify these modifications in a wider empirical
context. That would be a considerable undertaking and must await another occasion.
After Section 1, a brief introduction, Section 2 focuses on Chomsky’s (1998)
introduction and illustration of the need to recognise defective intervention effects. In
Chomsky (1999) what we find is not so much further examples of the notion, but a set of
cases where the phenomenon appears not to arise where we might expect it to. Of course, if
there are no defective intervention effects, these cases – defective defective intervention
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effects, as it were - cease to be puzzling, but it may nonetheless prove instructive to try to
unravel and assess the details of the argumentation, and Section 3 seeks to do this. Section 4
offers some concluding remarks.1
1. Introduction
Chomsky (1995, 297) embeds a statement of the MLC in the definition of the operation
attract in (1):
(1) K attracts F if F is the closest feature that can enter into a checking relation with a
sublabel of K.
In (1), ‘closest’ is to be interpreted in terms of whatever metric proves appropriate for
measuring syntactic distance (cf. Chomsky op. cit., 299), and it is this part of the definition in
(1) that expresses the MLC - if G can enter into a checking relation with a sublabel of K but is
not as close to K as is F, then K will not attract G. A major advantage in regarding the MLC
as part of the definition of attract, is that derivations containing violations of the MLC are not
even constructed. As a consequence, computations of economy (at least in this regard) are
entirely ‘local,’ with the most economical choice being forced at the point of application of an
operation, and the need to compute economy over sets of derivations, with the most
economical being preferred, is removed. With this innovation, some of the concerns
concerning computational complexity expressed, for instance, by Johnson and Lappin (1997)
do not arise. 
The notions of attraction and checking appearing in (1) are replaced in Chomsky (1998,
1999), by a complex of relations and operations, including Match, Agree and Move, and an
obvious first task is to formulate a version of (1) within this new framework. Two remarks on
                                                     
1  Chomsky (2001) became available after this paper was completed. There, without acknowledging
any of the difficulties I discuss below, Chomsky offers a different approach to defective
intervention effects.  This appears to depend on adopting Multiple Agree in something like the
sense of  Hiraiwa (2001). Suppose that some appropriate matching criterion hold between α and
both β and γ in the configuration in (i):
 (i) α … β …γ
 Then, we have Agree (α, β) and Agree (α, γ) with the presence of β not blocking the latter
operation because it is α  that renders β  inactive. This is to be contrasted with (ii), where
matching is again satisfied between α and both β and γ, but where β is now rendered inactive by
α′ distinct from α:
(ii) α … α′ …β … γ
 In these circumstances, inactive β will count as an intervener and block Agree (α, γ). Careful
assessment of this proposal  is likely to be of considerable interest, but is not possible here.
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(1) indicate the direction in which we should proceed. First, (1) was intended to embrace
cases of overt attraction (category movement) and covert attraction (feature movement).
Second, the content of (1) is fundamentally concerned with covert attraction, which, for
Chomsky (1995), is regarded as the basic operation linking structural positions. Put simply,
the fact that overt category movement satisfies (1) is parasitic on the fact that an individual
feature or set of features within the category does so, with the movement of overt
phonological material being a consequence of factors having nothing to do with the
motivation for the operation of attraction itself. In the more recent framework, Agree is the
operation that takes over the empirical burden of feature attraction in Chomsky (1995), so the
obvious step to take is to incorporate the MLC into a definition of Agree.
To avoid unnecessary complications, let us suppose that the appropriate metric for
computing ‘closeness’ is based entirely on c-command. We might, then, propose (2), where >
designates c-command:
(2) Agree (α, β) if and only if:
(i) α > β;
(ii) Match (α, β);
(iii) there is no γ such that Match (α, γ) and α > γ > β. 
Here, the MLC is expressed by (iii), and, introducing terminology, we might say that γ
falsifying (iii) intervenes between α and β and serves to block Agree (α, β). From this
perspective, γ falsifying (iii) in this way gives rise to an intervention effect.
While the sense of (2) should be readily apparent, it is arguably not the most
perspicuous formulation of what we are looking for. Note that Agree is properly viewed as an
operation which, when it applies to α and β occurring in a particular syntactic object,
produces a modified syntactic object and (2) tells us nothing about the nature of this
operation.2 What (2) does is set out the conditions under which Agree can apply, but a
moment’s reflection indicates that these can be specified more naturally as conditions on the
relation Match.  
                                                     
2 Proper consideration of this matter raises a number of complex issues. For instance, Chomsky
wishes to maintain that if Agree (α, β) takes place, then, supposing further conditions are
satisfied, the uninterpretable features in α are (a) deleted with respect to narrow syntax; (b)
valued for the purposes of phonology. Furthermore, deleted features can remain in the derivation
in a way determined by the architecture of phases.   This appears to require that the output of
Agree can comprise two types of feature.  I shall return to these issues in Section 3.
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Suppose, using the terminology of Chomsky (1998, 1999), that α is a set of
uninterpretable features comprising a probe. We can propose (3), where the relevant features
of β (those identical to features in α) comprise a goal:3
(3) Match (α, β) if and only if:
(i) α and β are active;
(ii) α > β;
(iii) α ⊆ β;
(iv) there is no γ such that α ⊆ γ and α > γ  >  β.
 
Here, (i) requires that included in both α and β are uninterpretable features and (iii) is
intended to express the proposition that matching cannot be ‘partial’ with only some features
of α being identical to those of β, the remainder perhaps being identified with those of some
more remote goal. Taking account of the fact that satisfaction of Match is a necessary
condition for the operation Agree, this has the consequence that it is not possible for α to
agree with more than one other object. As Chomsky (1998, 40) puts it, focusing on the core
case in which the φ-set of a finite T acts as a probe: ‘We take deletion to be a “one fell
swoop” operation, dealing with the φ-set as a unit. Its features cannot selectively delete: either
all or none. The φ-features of T do not agree with different NPs, for example.’ While (iii) has
this desirable consequence for Agree, I do not believe that it has ever been explicitly adopted
by Chomsky, and in what follows, it will play a significant role. Finally, (iv) is a statement of
                                                     
3 It is important for Chomsky that identity of features abstracts away from feature values. Thus, the
unvalued feature [person] is identical to the valued  feature [3person].  It is this notion of identity
that is crucial to the subset relations appearing in (iii) and (iv). So, for instance, {[person],
[number]} ⊆ {[3person, Sgnumber]}. As (3) is worded, it is not appropriate to strengthen the
improper subset relation in (iii) and (iv) to set identity.  This is because in the central example of
the φ-set of T seeking a matching goal, an appropriate goal will contain an uninterpretable Case
feature that renders it active. As (3i) indicates, the requirement to be active is a condition on β, so
the uninterpretable Case feature must be regarded as belonging to β. As a token of this feature
does not belong to α, it follows that here at least, we need α ⊆ β.  It is, of course, possible to
contemplate a definition of Match that utilises set identity, as in (a):
 (a) Match (α, β) if and only if:
 (i) α is active, β ⊆ δ and δ is active;
 (ii) α > β;
 (iii) α = β;
 (iv) there is no γ such that α = γ and  α > γ > β.
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the MLC, and it contains one noteworthy feature; unlike α and β, γ is not required to be
active.4 A minimally distinct formulation to (3) is (4):
(4) Match (α, β) if and only if:
(i) α and β are active;
(ii) α > β;
(iii) α ⊆ β;
(iv) there is no active γ such that α ⊆ γ and α >  γ >  β.
The question that immediately arises is: which of (3) or (4) is correct (if either)? A syntactic
object (feature complex) is inactive if it contains no uninterpretable features, and a
consequence of inactive status is that such a complex is not available as a goal – it is defective
in one sense of this term.5 This becomes particularly important in the system of Chomsky
(1998, 1999), which regards the ultimate deletion of features as determined by the structure of
phases. From this perspective, an uninterpretable feature occurring in phase Pn is merely
‘marked for deletion’ (Pesetsky and Torrego, 2000) until Pn + 1 is reached, and it remains
accessible to the computation in some sense to be made precise throughout this period: it
enjoys the afterlife referred to above.6  If we have cases of inactive γ blocking Match in this
way, it is appropriate to refer to these as cases of defective intervention effects, so the choice
between (3) and (4) comes down to the question: do defective intervention effects exist?
2. The Case for Defective Intervention Effects
Chomsky’s (1998, 38-9) answer to the question posed at the end of the introduction is
affirmative. He introduces ‘defective intervention constraints’ as ‘occurring in [α > β > Γ], …
                                                     
4 There are further issues raised by formulations such as (3) that I shall not pursue here. For
instance, (3ii) requires that the relation of c-command  must be definable for subsets of the
features comprising the nodes in  familiar phrase structure representations. I don’t believe any
interesting substantive issues arise in this connection, but prudence would see the details worked
out and presented. For the suggestion that c-command can be readily extended to features and
feature sets, see Chomsky (1998, 32). 
5 It is important to clearly distinguish this notion of defectiveness from that employed by Chomsky
in his discussions of infinitival T in raising and ECM constructions. In this latter context,
defectiveness is identified with having an incomplete (relative to finite T and infinitival T in
control structures) φ-set. The idea of defectiveness we are concerned with here is quite different.
6 As is well known, Chomsky (1995) also contains a treatment of the removal of uninterpretable
features from the computation that distinguishes between the deletion and erasure of checked
features.  The precise relationship between the deletion/erasure and marked for deletion/deletion
contrasts will not be pursued here. As the subsequent footnote makes clear, however, these
contrasts cannot be identified.  
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where β and Γ match the probe α, but β is inactive so that the effects of matching are
blocked.’ Before turning to cases, let us briefly consider one consequence of this answer. For
simplicity, suppose that a single uninterpretable feature F is what makes β active when it
enters the computation. We further suppose that this feature is marked for deletion by some
operation, and continues with this ‘intermediate’ status until the appropriate phase is reached.
Between the derivational stage at which it is marked for deletion and the phase at which it is
actually deleted, the very same feature is not accessible as a goal, but is accessible for the
MLC, as the latter is understood in (3iv).7 While this characterisation goes some way towards
satisfying the call for precision signalled above, I believe that this dual notion of accessibility
is prima facie uncomfortable, and provides an initial reason for harbouring suspicions about
the notion of defective intervention.8
Chomsky (1998) contains a number of examples that are intended to illustrate the
necessity for allowing an intermediate syntactic object to be inactive while still giving rise to
intervention effects, and thereby favouring (3) over (4). It is appropriate to consider these in
turn. One is provided by (5) (p. 45, Chomsky’s  (47iv)):
(5) *there seem [SU several people] are [PRED friends of yours]
The details of how predicate nominals are analysed in terms of Chomsky’s assumptions are
not clear, but this is not important for the argument sketched here, as the general intentions
are apparent enough. What he says about (5) is that it ‘illustrates a defective intervention
                                                     
7 This is sufficient to establish a distinction between the deletion/erasure contrast of Chomsky
(1995) and the marked for deletion/deletion contrast In Chomsky (1995), it was not possible for a
single feature to be simultaneously erased (invisible at LF and invisible to the computation) and
deleted (invisible at LF but visible to the computation). What we have here, however, appears to
allow a feature to be accessible/inaccessible to the computation in certain respects.
8 A possibility to bear in mind is that of treating the MLC as an ‘interpretive’ principle operative at
the LF-interface, an option that Chomsky (1999, 22) appears to be attracted by in his discussion
of Object Shift. If we were to follow this route, it could be maintained that being marked for
deletion insulates an object from operations in the narrow syntactic computation, where the goal
credentials of an object are vital, but leaves it visible to LF-interpretive processes (note that the
distinction still cannot be identified with that between deletion and erasure, as the latter
concerned visibility/invisibility in the computation). Without wishing to suggest that such an
account could not be developed, it should be noted that this strategy loses the determinacy gained
by building the MLC into the definition of Attract, Agree or Match, i.e. we would effectively
extract (iv) from (3, 4) and treat it as an independent LF-condition. This, in turn, would allow the
narrow syntax to produce derivations that were subsequently ruled out at LF, introducing the
need for backtracking. In his web-published commentary on Chomsky (1999), Uriagereka (n.d.)
appears to suggest that backtracking in a ‘narrow derivational window’ need not compromise the
system. This may be the case, but without a detailed framework for assessing the consequences
of computational complexity, the non-existence of backtracking procedures of any kind retains its
attractiveness. I am grateful to Norio Nasu for a remark that prompted these observations. 
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effect’ as ‘SU is visible (barring PRED as goal) but inactive, unable to establish agreement
with matrix T.’ As far as the details of the derivation go, we need to consider the point at
which matrix T is merged to give (6):
(6) T seem [several people are friends of yours]
Reconstructing Chomsky’s argument, the φ-set of T seeks a goal, and while the φ-set of
people is a superset of the probe’s φ-set, it does not qualify as a goal because several people is
inactive, its Case feature having been deleted in the subordinate clause. Despite this status, the
φ-set of people can block the satisfaction of Match between the φ-sets of T and friends, i.e. the
φ-set of people constitutes a defective intervener. Accordingly, we have neither Match (T,
people) because of the inactive status of people, nor Match (T,  friends) because of the role of
the φ-set of people as a defective intervener, and the φ-set of T cannot be deleted and valued
from within its domain.9 Nor is the structure saved by merging there with (6), since it is
assumed that there contains only a [person] feature and, being φ-incomplete, it is not able to
delete the φ-set of T (see Chomsky (1998, 40; 1999, 4). Thus, the derivation continues to
contain uninterpretable features and does not converge.
Now, it is obvious what Chomsky is trying to establish here, but it is equally clear that
the example doesn’t serve these goals. This is because if it is to illustrate a defective
intervention  effect, the defective intervener must intervene between a probe and an active
goal (cf. 3i, 4i). But (7) indicates very straightforwardly that friends cannot function as an
active goal in (6):
(7) several people are friends of yours
We must suppose that in the derivation of (7) all uninterpretable features are deleted. But (7)
is just the subordinate clause in (5), so presumably, friends contains no uninterpretable
features at the relevant stage of the derivation of (5), i.e. it is no more active than people is.
This way of looking at things yields the conclusion that we have neither Match (T, people)
nor Match (T, friends) in (6) because neither people nor friends fulfils the conditions on β in
(3i) (or 4i). But this is all we need in order to account for the non-convergent status of (5). If
merged there does not delete the uninterpretable φ-features of matrix T and if there is no
active lower goal for this T to agree with, the derivation will not converge. We need say no
                                                     
9 From now on, I shall use expressions such as Match (T, people) rather than a more cumbersome
expression indicating that it is only designated features of T and people that enter into the relation
Match.
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more. It appears, then, that (5) provides no evidence for the need to recognise defective
intervention effects.
In a footnote to his discussion of (5), Chomsky cites (8), maintaining that this ‘perennial
trouble maker … falls into place if the (undeleted) [person] feature of embedded there bars
association of matrix T to [three men].’ (Chomsky’s text has a man, an obvious typographical
error):10
(8) *there seem there to be three men in the room
To understand the issue here, we need to first consider the intermediate stage of the derivation
in (9):
(9) there to be three men in the room
Chomsky’s assumptions demand that infinitival T here is φ-incomplete, containing only
uninterpretable [person]. After Agree operates between this [person] feature and the complete
φ-set of men, the former is marked for deletion, but remains accessible to the computation.
When there is merged in Spec, T, thereby satisfying T’s EPP feature, its [person] feature acts
as a probe, identifying the marked for deletion [person] feature of T as a goal. 11 Agree now
functions between there and infinitival T, and, as infinitival T is not φ-complete, the [person]
                                                     
10 Note that the fact that Chomsky’s own discusssion refers to the undeleted [person] feature of
there immediately indicates that defective intervention effects cannot be at issue here. If the
[person] feature of there is undeleted,  there is active and a candidate to function as a goal.
11 We appear to meet an inconsistency at this point.  If an item’s uninterpretable feature(s) are
marked for deletion, we have seen that that item should not be able to function as a goal, although
it may count as an intervener for defective intervention effects. However, for Chomsky’s
treatment of  there as an X0 able to act as a probe to go through (1998, 44), it must be the case
that the marked for deletion [person] feature of non-finite T can act as a goal. It is easy to see this
in the case of (i):
 (i) there are three men in the room
 To account for convergence in this case, Chomsky has to suppose that the [person] feature of
there is deleted under Agree with φ-complete T. But, as the φ-set of T has already been marked
for deletion under Agree with the φ-set of men, this account requires an item with its
uninterpretable features marked for deletion to be able to function as a goal. The inconsistency
can be removed by maintaining that being marked for deletion does not disqualify all
uninterpretable features as goals, with φ-features being an exception to this requirement, but such
a proposal does no more than restate the problem. In what follows, I shall not attempt to resolve
this inconsistency.
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feature of there is not marked for deletion under this operation. Moving on in the derivation,
we arrive at (10):
(10) T seem there to be three men in the room
Here, the φ-set of finite T acts as a probe and Chomsky’s comment suggests that the problem
arises because the [person] feature of there serves to block Agree (T, men). However, note
that the incomplete φ-set of there is not a subset of the complete φ-set of T. Accordingly, the
conditions for Match, as specified in (3, 4) are not satisfied, and T is free (in fact, required) to
probe further and identify the φ-set of men as a matching goal. From this, perspective, then,
(8) does not even display an intervention effect, even less a defective intervention effect.
Subsequent merger of there with (10) produces no new difficulties: the [person] feature of
there can identify the marked for deletion φ-set of matrix T as a goal and be deleted under
Agree (but see n10). However, there in the subordinate clause retains its [person] feature, and
this provides us with an account of the non-convergent status of (8) without invoking
intervention effects in any way. It seems, therefore, that the interpretation of Chomsky’s
assumptions adopted here yields a straightforward account of the non-convergent status of (8)
without resort to intervention effects of any kind. 
In the same footnote, Chomsky observes that his proposal for how to deal with (8) does
not extend to providing an account for the relative acceptability of (11):
(11)  there look as though there are three men in the room
Note that here the intermediate there is in the specifier position of finite T. Thus, its [person]
feature will be marked for deletion under agreement with φ-complete T on standard
assumptions. However, in terms of Chomsky’s own discussion, this state of affairs should
qualify intermediate there as a defective intervener at the later stage in the derivation when
the φ-set of finite matrix T is seeking a matching goal; Match (T, men) should be blocked
under (3) (although not under (4)). As the φ-set of matrix T cannot be deleted by merged φ-
incomplete there, the status of (11) remains problematic. Observe again, however, that if
Match requires the probe features to be a subset of the goal features, the [person] feature of
intermediate there will not be a candidate goal for the φ-set of matrix T, irrespective of its
active or inactive status. Thus, matrix T will be able to identify the φ-set of men as a goal, and
the agreement manifested in (11) is immediately accounted for. It appears, then, that (11) has
a straightforward account relying on no more than the requirement that goal features
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constitute a superset of probe features, and Chomsky’s suggestion (46) ‘that the [person]
barrier may be overridden in some manner’ is beside the point.12
Further evidence cited by Chomsky (1998, 46) for the importance of defective
intervention effects comes from the examples in (12) (his (48i, ii):
(12)a. *there were decided [α PRO to stay with friends]
      b. *XP T-seems that [α it was told friends CP]
The important observation here for Chomsky is that the Case features of PRO and it are
deleted in α with the consequence that they are inactive in later stages of the computation.
However, they remain effective as defective interveners, blocking the operation Agree
between the φ-features of matrix T and friends.13 As a consequence, in (12a), the
uninterpretable features of matrix T remain in the derivation and, as they are not deleted by
merger of φ-incomplete there in Spec, T, the derivation crashes. For (12b), the account is
similar: merger of there in the XP position does not delete the φ-features of T, raising of it
from the subordinate clause is not possible, as it is inactive as a goal, and raising of friends is
not possible because of the defective intervention effect induced by it. Thus, there is no way
to fill the XP position in (12b) so as to delete the φ-features of matrix T, and the derivation
fails to converge.
The reasoning introduced in connection with (8) and (11) is not applicable to (12a, b) if
we suppose that PRO and it are both φ-complete. This will qualify them as candidates for
matching the φ-set of matrix T, so it looks as if the only way to block Agree (T, friends) in
these cases is to invoke defective intervention. However, for (12a), this follows only if we
adopt Chomsky’s (1998, 1999) proposal that phases are ‘propositional’ and defined on v* and
C. In this structure, α is CP and thereby constitutes a phase, but the matrix clause does not
contain a phase-defining v*, so moving up the derivation from α, the next phase we come to
is matrix CP. Linking Spell-Out to phasal structure via the Phase Impenetrability Condition
(PIC) of Chomsky (1999, 10) ensures that PRO is still accessible to the computation at the
point at which matrix T is merged, and the difficulty arises.
                                                     
12 To temper enthusiasm, it is necessary to draw attention to the markedly less good status (for me)
of the ‘singular version’ of (11):
(i)?? there looks as though there’s a man in the room
13 As Andrew Radford has observed, in this example, friends will itself be inactive at the relevant
stage of the derivation on standard assumptions, its Case feature having been deleted by with. As
a consequence, the reasoning that follows regarding (12a) is not strictly necessary to establish its
failure to demonstrate the necessity of defective intervention effects.. 
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As noted in Chomsky (1998, 20-21), an alternative view of phases has on occasions
been considered. This is the view that they should be defined on the basis of convergence,
with a syntactic object that contains no uninterpretable features being immediately removed
from the computation and made available to the interfaces. He argues against this view, but in
Atkinson (2000) I maintained that this rejection was based on a failure to distinguish two
roles for phases in the system. On the one hand, they appear to be necessary to constrain
access of the computational system to the numeration, and from this point of view,
Chomsky’s insistence that phases cannot be identified with convergent portions of derivations
appears to be entirely justified (cf. Chomsky, 1998, 21). Additionally, however, they have a
derivational role, determining the stages in a derivation at which material can be sent to the
interfaces. Chomsky’s position presupposes that the notion of phase needed for these two
purposes is identical, but this may be incorrect. Specifically, I argued that juxtaposition of the
copy theory of movement with the orthodox, successive cyclic account of wh-movement and
the position on phases Chomsky favours leads to inconsistency. This inconsistency does not
arise if phases, for the purposes of structuring the derivation, are defined in terms of
convergence. In short, I suggested that it might be appropriate to distinguish lexical selection
phase and derivational phase, with only the former being defined on the basis of v* and C.14
Suppose, then, that we reconsider (12a), taking phases to be defined in terms of
convergence. The difficulty with it immediately fall into place. The CP α is convergent, so
nothing in α is available as a potential goal for the uninterpretable φ-set of matrix T at the
point at which it enters the derivation. Merger of φ-incomplete there in Spec, T will not serve
to delete this φ-set and the only way to ‘save’ this derivation would be to have a token of φ-
complete it available in the numeration to give (13):
(13) It was decided [PRO to stay with friends]
      
Unfortunately, (12b) does not yield to the same form of reasoning. In this construction, α is
not convergent, as the Case feature of friends remains undeleted at this point in the derivation,
and it follows that if the convergence view of phases is to be exploited here, it must be
supplemented in some way. One route that might be worth exploring is to consider how the
system might ‘test’ for convergence and the possibility that such testing may lead to false
                                                     
14 The empirical support for this conclusion was reinforced by the suggestion that phases defined in
terms of convergence provide a rather natural instantiation of the notion of ‘good design.’ A
syntactic object resulting from a convergent derivation is ‘complete’ as far as any derivation in
which it is embedded is concerned (setting aside the role of defective intervention effects), and it
therefore makes design sense for the computation to not proceed with the potential for accessing
this object, a potential that will never be realised. It is also noteworthy that the intuition that
phases should be ‘relatively independent in terms of interface properties’ (Chomsky, 1998, 20)
resonates with the idea that they be defined in terms of convergence.  
Essex Research Reports in Linguistics 37 (2001)
12
positives. It seems reasonable to suppose that such ‘testing’ should be bounded in some way,
and a natural way to construe such bounding is in terms of the ‘edge’ of a constituent.
Successive cyclic wh-movement can be used to illustrate this idea. A wh-item that is to
undergo further movement must retain an uninterpretable feature in an intermediate Spec, C.
Thus, a search of the ‘edge’ of this CP will be sufficient to conclude that it does not converge,
and it will remain accessible to later stages of the computation. Now, suppose that the system
always takes a decision on convergence on the basis of such an ‘edge’ search. In the case of
(12b), it will conclude (wrongly) that α is convergent and thereby ensure that no part of α is
accessible to later stages of the derivation. Of course, in this case, the conclusion is incorrect,
but this may be a price of requiring that the system acknowledge economy constraints such as
one restricting depth of search in tests of convergence.
Supposing that there is something to the above speculation, we can see that the status of
(12b) is accounted for without the invocation of defective intervention effects. The problem is
that α is incorrectly analysed as convergent, with the consequence that access to it is removed
from the computation. Thus, when matrix T enters the derivation, it is not that its route to
friends is blocked by inactive it; rather, there is no route to friends.15 
It may be of some interest that the above speculation can be extended to the last
example of defective intervention effects from Chomsky (1998) that I shall discuss here. This
is the case of wh-islands, illustrated by (14), where how is to be construed with the
subordinate clause. 
(14)*how did you discover [which car John will fix]
Chomsky’s recent work focuses on A-movement and does not contain a detailed account of
A′-movement. However, in a brief paragraph (1998, 44-5), assuming parallels with his
treatment of A-movement, he proposes that wh-expressions contain an uninterpretable [-wh]
feature (cf. Case features in A-movement), and an interpretable feature, Q, matched by an
uninterpretable feature Q in interrogative complementisers (cf. the role of φ-features in A-
movement). In (14), the intermediate C acts as a probe, locating which car as a goal, Agree is
triggered and (a) Q in the interrogative complementiser is deleted; (b) [wh-] in the wh-phrase
is deleted; (c) which car is raised to Spec, C to satisfy the P-requirement of C. At this point,
then, which car, having had its uninterpretable wh-feature deleted is inactive. Despite this, it
can block matching between the uninterpretable Q feature of the matrix C and the
                                                     
15  For what it’s worth, it is clear that the problem with (12b) resides in the clause it was told friends
CP. The account I am considering locates the difficulty in this clause, and does not refer at all to
failures to establish relationships between items in this clause and items higher in the structure.
This might be seen as a small piece of evidence for the proposal, and is reminiscent of
observations made by Epstein and Seeley (1999, 6).
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interpretable Q feature of how in the subordinate clause.  As a consequence, Agree (C, how) is
not triggered, and it is impossible for how to raise to matrix Spec, C – the inactive which car
serves to block Match (C, how).
It is worth noting that Chomsky’s own view of phasal structure can be invoked to
account for the properties of (14) without the need to recognise defective intervention effects.
To see this, we merely need to note that, under PIC, the complement of the lower C will no
longer be accessible to the computation at the matrix CP phase. So, while the ‘edge’ of this
CP, including which car remains accessible to the matrix C, how is no longer accessible, and
the question of whether which car intervenes to block Match (C, how) simply does not arise.
Additionally, the complement of the lower C will not converge because of the presence of an
uninterpretable [wh]-feature on how, and we can readily see that exactly the same
consequence arises if phases are defined in terms of convergence with the testing for
convergence being limited to ‘edges.’ Without the bounded search stipulation,, there are no
phases in the derivation of (14) before we get to the matrix C, and as both which car and how
remain accessible at this point, there would appear to be no alternative but to recognise
defective intervention. However, if we invoke the strategy introduced above for dealing with
(12b), we can see that the intermediate CP will constitute a phase that will be removed from
the computation before the derivation moves on. Thus, The [wh-] feature of how will not be
available as a potential goal for matrix C and the decision on phasehood will turn out to be
erroneous, when LF discovers an uninterpretable [wh-] feature on how. 
What I hope to have sketched so far, then, is an argument that the examples Chomsky
(1998) cites for the importance of defective intervention effects can be accounted for without
invoking this notion, so long as we maintain what looks like a reasonable constraint on Match
and we adopt a convergence based view of phases, decisions on phasehood being ‘risky,’
because of the system’s adherence to a bounded search.16 I shall now turn to the complex
discussion of defective intervention effects and their annulment in Chomsky (1999), with a
view to assessing whether the assumptions I have adopted are sufficient to deal with the
observations made there.
                                                     
16 There is one further case examined in Chomsky (1998, 47) that concerns the following
(translated) example from Icelandic:
(i).*me (DAT) seem (pl) [tme [John (DAT) to like horses (pl, NOM)]]
 The issue here is that the matrix verb cannot agree with the embedded nominative, a fact that
Chomsky describes as due to a ‘defective intervention effect’ with ‘the φ-features of John
block[ing] the T-associate relation between T-seem and nominative horses.’ It is conceivable that
the bounded search approach to testing for convergence might also play a role here, with the
uninterpretable Case feature of horses outside the edge of the subordinate clause, which is
therefore erroneously removed from the computation.   Without detailed knowledge of the issues
that might arise in Icelandic, there is little point in pursuing this speculation here.
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3. The Annulment of Defective Intervention Effects
The first reference to defective intervention effects in Chomsky (1999, 12-13) appears in
connection with his discussion of the examples in (15) (his (15ii, 16ii):
(15)a.  there is likely to arrive a man
b.  we expect there to arrive a man 
For (15a), Chomsky considers the structure in (16):
(16)  T be likely [there to arrive a man}
Rehearsing the analysis from Chomsky (1998), he maintains that the φ-set of matrix T acts as
a probe, locating the [person] feature of there as a goal. Agree (T, there) operates, deleting the
[person] feature of there and having the consequence that there is raised to Spec, T to satisfy
T’s EPP-feature. However, the φ-set of T is not deleted by φ-incomplete there, and is
therefore free to probe again, identifying the φ-set of man as a goal. Agree (T, man) leads to
the deletion and valuation of the φ-set of T and the Case feature of man, and the derivation
converges. In connection with the operation of Agree (T, man), Chomsky  observes that ‘no
intervention effect is induced by [the copy of there].’ This remark merits some reflection.
The copy theory of movement requires that the raising of there to Spec, T leaves a copy
of there in its initial position. Furthermore, since Agree (T, there) has the consequence that
the [person] feature of there is deleted, this will also be a characteristic of the copy (Chomsky,
1998, 29) We are thus led to consider (17), where the tokens of there are inactive by virtue of
containing no uninterpretable features (the subscripts are simply to enable unambiguous
identification in the subsequent text, and I adopt the convention of prefixing uninterpretable
features by u and striking through features marked for deletion):
(17)   there1          T              be likely  [there2        to arrive  a man]
       [uperson] [uperson]                        [uperson]                     [3person]
[unumber]          [Sgnumber]
If defective intervention effects constitute a general phenomenon, we would predict that
Agree (T, man) should be blocked by the intervening there2. Clearly, this is incorrect, so steps
must be taken to nullify the effects of there2 as a defective intervener.
17 To this end, Chomsky
                                                     
17 It is worth re-iterating remarks made in the introduction at this point. Chomsky has introduced
the notion of defective intervention, and I have suggested that it is (a) conceptually suspect; (b)
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makes two proposals. First, he offers (18), as a principle ‘which has been suggested in various
forms’:
(18)  maximise matching effects
Second, he considers (19), which he regards as ‘conceptually plausible and empirically
supported.’
(19) only the head of an A-chain (equivalently, the whole chain) blocks
 matching under the MLC  
Applying these to (17), it is easy to see how they are intended to produce the desired outcome.
Take (18) first. The natural way to construe this is as a constraint on Match: if α and β do not
match maximally, then it is not the case that Match (α, β). Put like this, (18) looks like an
informal version of (3ii, 4ii), the requirement that the features comprising a probe should be a
(possibly improper) subset of an appropriate goal.18 In (17), {[uperson], [unumber]} from T
act as a probe. Locating there2, this probe finds {[uperson]}, but, as matching is not maximal,
we do not have Match (T, there2). A deeper search locates {[3person], [Sgnumber]} at man.
Matching is maximal, so we have Match (T, man) and Agree (T, man) can operate.
Whereas the status of (18) is relational, voiding the defective intervention potential of
there2 because of its relationship to T, (19) is absolute. Because there2 is not the head of an A-
chain, it is disqualified as a defective intervener tout court. What we appear to have, then, is
an overdetermination of the properties of  (15a), with either (18) or (19) being sufficient to
block the defective intervention status of there2.
It is straightforward to see that the first of the above arguments is difficult to sustain.
Recall that the raising of there to Spec, T is a consequence of Agree (T, there) operating in
the configuration (16). But there in (16) no more provides a maximal match for the φ-set of T
                                                                                                                                                                     
not necessary for examples where it is invoked. We now meet a situation where Chomsky’s own
assumptions lead him to expect a defective intervention effect and the need to produce an account
of why we don’t have one. It would be much more straightforward to maintain that the reason we
don’t have one here is because defective intervention effects don’t exist!
18 There are, of course, other construals that could be contemplated. For instance, if we suppose that
the subset requirement is not satisfied anywhere within the domain of the probe, it might be
suggested that an appropriate goal is whatever provides the largest number of features that can be
identified with features of the probe. However, it is not difficult to see problems for such a
construal. For instance, it is not guaranteed to provide a single goal, as there could be candidate
goals in the domain matching the probe to the same extent. Furthermore, it requires exhaustive
search of the domain before it can safely identify a goal. The subset condition in (3ii, 4ii) gives
rise to neither of these difficulties. The closest β in the domain of α such that α ⊆ β constitutes
the unique goal for probe α. If there is no β satisfying the subset requirement, α has no accessible
goal.
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than does there2 in (17). Accordingly, if Chomsky is to be consistent, he must suppose that we
do not have Match (T, there) in (16). What we have is Match (T, man), and the prediction that
(20) is the next stage in the derivation:19
(20) a man T be likely [there to arrive a man]
The issues raised by (19) are slightly more complex. This is because whereas the
straightforward interpretation of (18) is that it imposes an obligatory constraint on Match,
(19), as worded, is permissive in the sense that it allows an object that is not the head of an A-
chain to be transparent to Match. It does not, however, require this transparency. Now, it is
not clear to me whether Chomsky intends this permissive interpretation of (19). If he intends
something stronger, a wording along the lines of (21) would be more appropriate:
(21)  the head of an A-chain (equivalently the whole chain) blocks matching under the
MLC and an object that is not the head of an A-chain is transparent to matching.
Given this, we first note that there in (16) is no more the head of an A-chain than is there2  in
(17), since a standard requirement is that an A-chain contains a θ-position. If (21) is what is
intended, it should be clear that it gives rise to exactly the same difficulties as (18). However,
(19) does not require there in (16) to be transparent to Match, and (19) is therefore compatible
with Agree (T, there) operating in (16), as Chomsky’s account demands. Equally, for (17),
(19) permits there2 to be transparent for matching purposes, so Agree (T, man) is a legitimate
operation at this stage in the derivation.
Although the above suggests that the imposition of (19) is consistent with Chomsky’s
account of (15a), there is one noteworthy complication. As (19) is permissive, it allows there
in (16) to be transparent to matching. Thus, we can have Agree (T, man) and derive (20) as
the next stage in the derivation. As observed in n17, this does not require that the system
recognise *a man is likely there to arrive as convergent, as a consequence of Agree (T, man)
is the deletion of T’s ϕ-set. So this ϕ-set will not act as a probe again, with the result that the
[person] feature of there remains undeleted. Thus, while (19) permits two derivations to be
                                                     
19 Note that we do not go so far as to predict that (i) is well-formed:
 (i) *a man is likely there to arrive
 This is because the [person] feature of there will remain undeleted in (20), so the derivation will
not    converge. A possibility that will be considered further below is that different conditions
might be imposed on Match depending on whether a potential goal is active or not. According to
this way of looking of things, it might be possible to maintain that matching obtains between T
and there in (16) but not between T and there2  in (17). The relevant discussion concerns (28) and
(29) below.
Essex Research Reports in Linguistics 37 (2001)
17
constructed on the basis of the lexical array underlying (15a), only one of these is convergent
and it corresponds to the correct structure. By contrast, (18) and (21) appear to require that
only the non-convergent derivation is available.    
Is it possible to offer an account of  (15a) that overcomes the difficulties with (18) and
(21) and offers an alternative to adopting (19)? An obvious candidate for such an account is to
subscribe to what Chomsky (1999) refers to as Alternative (II) (see also Epstein and Seeley,
1999). According to this view, there is no A-movement in the derivation of (15a), and there is
merged directly in Spec, T. At the relevant stage of the derivation, we have (22):
(22)  T be likely [to arrive a man]
The uninterpretable ϕ-set of T probes and locates the ϕ-set of man as a matching goal. This
matching is maximal in the sense that the subset condition of (3ii, 4ii) is satisfied. Agree
operates, deleting and valuing the ϕ-features of T along with the Case feature of man. Since
there is present in the lexical array, the principle of Merge over Move, requires that the EPP
feature of T is satisfied by pure Merge of there. The [person] feature of there is deleted under
Agree (there, T) and the derivation converges.20 On this account, there are no potential
defective interveners, and therefore no requirement that their status be annulled. Even without
defective interveners, the principle in (18) (interpreted as 3ii, 4ii) plays a role, but not one that
leads to inconsistency. However, the lack of copies of moved objects means that the account
does not rely on (19) or (21) at all.
Similar considerations arise for the ECM construction in (15b). Chomsky focuses on the
representation in (23):
(23)  we [v*P v* - expect [there to arrive a man]]
Of this representation, he says (12): ‘Agree holds of (v*, [there]), deleting the [person] feature
of [there] but leaving v* intact so that Agree holds of (v*, man).’ As Chomsky leaves open
the question of whether there raises to Spec, v* or to some other position in v*P, the issue of
copies of moved items giving rise to defective intervention does not necessarily arise.
However, even with the passage cited here, it is easy to see the difficulty with Chomsky’s
account in the light of (18) or (21).  The match between the ϕ-set of v* and the [uperson]
feature of there is not maximal, so there should simply be bypassed in v*’s search for a goal,
which yields Match (v*, man).  Agree (v*, man) has the consequence that the ϕ-set of v* is
                                                     
20 It is worth reiterating that, as it stands, this account still embraces the inconsistency raised in n10
of allowing a marked for deletion feature, in this case the [person] feature of matrix T, to function
as a goal. 
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deleted so that v* cannot subsequently act as a probe. The [person] feature of there remains
undeleted, and no convergent derivation can be constructed. Equally, for (21), there is not the
head of an A-chain, so v*’s search for a goal should immediately proceed to man with the
noted undesirable consequences.
As far as the role of (19) with respect to (23) is concerned, parallel considerations to
those discussed for (16) arise. The convergent derivation is available, as (19) permits Match
(v*, there). Additionally, the non-convergent derivation required by adherence to (18) or (21)
is produced if the permission licensed by (19) is not exercised and the system regards there as
transparent for matching. 
For an alternative that avoids these difficulties, the obvious suggestion is to suppose that
v* has an EPP-feature that is satisfied by pure Merge of there. Thus, we first consider a stage
of the derivation schematised in (24):
(24) [v*P we v*-expect [to arrive a man]]
Match (v*, man) is the only option under (3ii, 4ii), and the ϕ-set of v* is deleted along with
the Case feature of man, both of which are also valued as a consequence of Agree. Then,
there is merged as an outer Spec, v* to satisfy v*’s EPP feature, and its [uperson] feature is
deleted under Agree (there, v*) (but see n18). Subsequent merger of matrix T yields (25):
(25) T [v*P  there [we [v* - expect [to arrive a man]]]]
In (25), the complete φ-set of T locates the φ-set of we as a goal, skipping the intermediate
there, which does not satisfy (3ii, 4ii). Raising of we to satisfy the EPP feature of matrix T
along with raising of the verbal complex gives us (15b).
As noted already, reliance on either (18) or (19) is thought by Chomsky to yield the
desired effects for (15a, b).21 The next pair of examples considered, he maintains, enable us to
discriminate between these two principles. The examples are (p. 13):
(26)a. there seem to have been caught several fish
      b. we expect there to have been caught several fish
                                                     
21 In fact  Chomsky observes that (19) has a role in the derivation of (15b) only if the raising of
there  to Spec, v* or  ‘to a position within the v* complement’ (37) takes place in (23). This
seems to be mistaken, since even if there remains in situ in (23), it does not constitute the head of
an A-chain, and (19) will permit the φ-set of v* to regard it as transparent in its search for a
matching goal.   
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The important additional property that shows up in these examples is that of agreement
(morphologically marked in Icelandic, for example) between the participle caught and fish.
Focusing on (26a), Chomsky suggests that we first consider the stage of the derivation in (27),
where ‘… PRT is a light verb distinct from v*’ (p. 37):
(27)  [α PRT [catch [DO several fish]]
As PRT is assumed to be adjectival, Chomsky further proposes that its φ-set ‘consist[s] of
(unvalued) number, gender and Case, but not person’ (p. 14).22 The φ-set of PRT acts as a
probe, locating the interpretable φ-set of fish as a goal. Since the latter set is complete, the
[unumber] and [ugender] features of PRT are marked for deletion and valued, the latter
operation ensuring the correct morphological agreement in a language where this is overt.
However, since neither of the Case features of PRT and fish are themselves valued, they are
incapable of deleting and valuing each other. Accordingly, when α is completed, both PRT
and fish remain active in the derivation.
Chomsky next considers (28):
(28)    T       seem [there        to have been [αPRT       [catch [DO several fish]]]]
     [uperson]          [uperson]                           [unumber]                        [3person]
                 [unumber]                                                     [ugender]                       [Sgnumber]
                  [ugender]                                                      [uCase]                            [?gender] 
                        [uCase] 
Generalising the discussion from (15a), he supposes that the ϕ-set of matrix T acts as a probe
and locates the [uperson] feature of there as a goal. The consequences are deletion of the
[uperson] feature of there and raising of there to Spec, T to satisfy T’s EPP feature (not
included in the representations):23
                                                     
22 I assume that it is a slip to regard Case as belonging to the φ-set of PRT. More accurately, we
should say that its uninterpretable features contain the unvalued φ-features [number] and [gender]
and a Case feature. 
23 Note the tension here between this attitude to the consequences of Agree (T, there) and that
described in the text for Agree (PRT, fish). As far as the latter is concerned, the Case feature of
fish cannot value the Case feature of  PRT, being itself unvalued, and this is linked to the non-
deletion of the Case feature of PRT. For Agree (T, there), we again have matching of unvalued
features ([uperson]), but here there is no talk of lack of valuation and the familiar deletion
consequences of Agree are assumed to occur. Of course, there is the difference that whereas case
valuation of PRT is overt in some cases, overt valuation of the [person] feature of a pure
expletive is not an option. Arguably, however, this is incidental, and should not be used to
‘massage’ the fundamental operations of the system.  
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(29) there1     T    seem [there2 to have been [α PRT   [catch [DO several fish]]]]
    [uperson] [uperson]    [uperson]                     [unumber]                     [3person]
                    [unumber]                                        [ugender]                    [Sgnumber]
                    [ugender]                                           [uCase]                       [?gender]
           [uCase] 
The φ-set of matrix T now probes again. The first thing we note is that by reasoning identical
to that invoked for his analysis of (15a), Chomsky maintains that there2 is transparent to the
search for a goal – it does not provide a maximal match for the φ-set of matrix T, nor is it the
head of an A-chain. Thus, as far as there2 is concerned, there is nothing to prevent the φ-set of
matrix T identifying the φ-set of fish as a goal. But what about PRT?
Recall that the assumptions in play have PRT with [unumber] and [ugender] features
marked for deletion, but still active by virtue of its undeleted Case feature. Chomsky says (p.
14): ‘ … the probe T matches the still visible goal PRT, valuing its Case feature; and the
probe matches the goal DO, valuing the Case feature of DO as well as its own features (since
DO is φ-complete).’ Thus, on the one hand, matrix T’s search for a goal stops at PRT, and on
the other, it bypasses PRT to locate DO. What justifies this second step for Chomsky?
In response to this question, he again refers to the voiding of intervention effects via
(18) and (19). In this connection, he says (ibid.): ‘Once again there is no intervention effect
induced by [there], or in this case by PRT either. In the case of [(15a, b)] there were two
possible reasons: principle [(19)] (assuming raising of [there] to within matrix VP) or
principle [(18)], which requires maximal (probe, goal) effects. In [(29)], there is no raising of
PRT, so we must resort to principle [(18)] … The [number/gender] features of the probe
bypass  [there2] and its [person] feature bypasses PRT, allowing probe-DO match.’ It appears,
then, that Chomsky has an argument that (18), involving the maximisation of matching, is the
operative principle throughout these examples.24
Not surprisingly, it is not difficult to see that (18) does not give rise to the desired
effects in Chomsky’s analysis of (28). The status of there in (28) and there2 in (29) is identical
to what we saw in connection with (15a). Since there2 in (29) is a copy of there1, it is unclear
how a principle such as (18) can differentiate between them, and if there2 is obligatorily
                                                     
24 For the sake of not complicating the discussion further, I shall assume that Chomsky is correct in
his assessment of the irrelevance of (19) for the analysis of the role of PRT in (28).  However, it
is easy to see that while his remark that there is no raising of PRT in this construction is correct,
this does not impinge on the significance of (19). The principle in question refers explicitly to the
property of being the head of an A-chain as what is responsible for the defective intervention
potential of an object. But PRT is no more the head of an A-chain than is an expletive.
Accordingly, on the permissive construal of (19) I have presented in the text, there is nothing to
prevent PRT being transparent to matrix T’s search for a goal.
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bypassed by the goal-seeking φ-set of matrix T in (29), it is necessary that there is similarly
bypassed in (28). Setting aside the role of PRT and assuming the search for a goal extends to
fish, we predict the next stage in the derivation to be (30):
(30) several fish T seem [there to have been [caught several fish]]
As regards PRT, the situation at first sight appears to be similarly inconsistent, although there
is one difference that might be regarded as important, a difference that, having being clarified,
might also provide a way of dealing with the expletive problem raised in connection with
(15a) and now generalised to (28). Recall that what Chomsky proposes is that the φ-set of T
treats PRT in two different ways. On the one hand, with its undeleted Case feature, it
constitutes a goal for this probe, a consequence of which is the deletion of this Case feature.
With its Case feature now deleted, it can no longer function as a goal, but we might expect it
to produce a defective intervention effect, blocking Match (T, fish). However, it doesn’t do
this, and Chomsky proposes to account for this inability by relying on (18).
At this point, the interpretation of (18) for Chomsky becomes crucial. To date, I have
regarded it as an informal version of (3ii, 4ii), but if consistency is to be achieved, it is readily
apparent that this can’t be what he has in mind here. In an attempt to make sense of the
proposal, I see no alternative but to painstakingly (or, perhaps, painsmakingly!) reproduce the
various steps of the account. In (29), then, the φ-set of matrix T acts as a probe and locates
active PRT. Under (3ii, 4ii), we do not have Match (T, PRT), but if matching is a prerequisite
for the operation of Agree, and if the deletion and valuation of PRT’s Case feature is a
consequence of Agree, then it must be the case for Chomsky that the conditions on matching
are satisfied here. An interim conclusion, then, is that Chomsky’s position is not consistent
with the conditions on Match formulated in (3ii, 4ii). Let’s recognise this by saying that
Match′ (T, PRT) in (29), where Match′ is whatever Chomsky has in mind.25 With PRT now
inactive, T’s ϕ-set probes again and can apparently bypass PRT to yield Match′ (T, fish). But
recall Chomsky’s (1998, 38-39) original characterisation of defective intervention effects
referred to earlier as ‘occurring in [α > β > Γ], … where β and Γ match the probe α, but Γ is
inactive so that the effects of matching are blocked.’ (my italics – MA). We have inactive
PRT and Match′ (T, PRT), so PRT should count as a defective intervener. As it doesn’t, and
as the reason Chomsky gives for it not so doing refers to maximisation of matching, it would
appear to follow that the matching referred to in this principle cannot be Match′. The only
way I can make sense of this is to suppose that Chomsky is operating with two distinct
                                                     
25 Presumably, a minimal condition on Match′(α, β) is that there is δ ∈ α such that δ ∈ β, i.e. at
least one feature in the probe also occurs in the goal. If, in addition, there must be η ∈ α such that
η ∉ β, we perhaps have all we need for a definition of Match′.
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notions of matching. On the one hand, there is Match, satisfying (3ii, 4ii), and on the other,
Match′. For a potential goal β that is active, Match′ (α, β) will be sufficient to trigger Agree
(α, β); however, if β is inactive, Match′ (α, β) does not have this consequence (Match (α, β)
is required), and α must probe again in a search for a more remote goal γ. 
Before proceeding, let us check that the above reconstruction is consistent with what
Chomsky appears to intend, at least as far as the goal status of the ϕ-sets of PRT and fish in
(29) are concerned. The φ-set of matrix T acts as a probe and locates active PRT as a goal.
PRT is active and Match’ (T, PRT) is sufficient to trigger Agree; as a consequence the Case
feature of PRT is deleted and valued, but, as the φ-set of PRT is incomplete, the φ-set of
matrix T remains undeleted and probes again. For this process, PRT is inactive, so Match (T,
PRT) is required if PRT is to block T’s search for a goal. This condition is not satisfied, so T
can bypass PRT and locate active fish as a goal. We have Match’ (T, fish), so Agree (T, fish)
operates, with the consequence that all relevant features are marked for deletion.26 In short, it
appears that we can preserve an intelligible role for (18) if we are prepared to countenance
two notions of matching. If an active goal β is identified by a probe α, Match′ (α, β) is
sufficient to trigger Agree (α, β). If, however, inactive β is identified in the search for a goal,
Match′ (α, β) allows α to bypass β in its search for a goal. Only if Match (α, β) obtains, will
β block a deeper search and, in these circumstances, count as a defective intervener.
With this much in place, we can return to (15a) and immediately see that similar
considerations might be invoked here.  We have (17), repeated as (31):
(31) there1         T              be likely [there2        to arrive  a man]
     [uperson]  [uperson]                       [uperson]                     [3person]
                      [unumber]                                                         [Sgnumber]
This configuration is produced by Match′ being satisfied by the φ-set of matrix T and the
[uperson] feature of there, a situation that is possible because, with its [uperson] feature
undeleted, there is active. However, after the operation of Agree triggered by this token of
Match′ being satisfied, there is no longer active and (18), as it is now being construed,
requires that it be bypassed by matrix T’s φ-set in its search for a goal. It is easy to see that
these considerations can be straightforwardly extended to deal with the relations between T
and there in (25) and (28).
                                                     
26 I use Match′ (T, fish) here, since fish is assumed to be active. Accordingly, Match′ (T, fish) is all
that is needed to trigger Agree, and the fact that we have Match (T, fish) is immaterial. This
indicates that  (18) does not drive a probe to seek a maximal match as such. Rather, it provides a
license for a probe to bypass any nonactive object that does not provide a maximal match. In
other words, only inactive objects that provide a maximal match for a probe will give rise to
defective intervention effects.
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It might be appropriate to attempt to summarise the above discussion in general terms.
There are three configurations of which we need to take account, schematised in (32) (α
active and able to function as a probe throughout):27
(32)a.  α > γ > β; γ and β both active, γ matches α but not maximally, β matches α
maximally (i. e. Match′(α, γ) and Match (α, β)).
b. α > γ > β; γ inactive and β active, γ matches α but not maximally, β matches α
maximally. (i. e. Match′(α, γ) and Match (α, β)).
c. α > γ > β; γ inactive and β active, γ matches α maximally, β matches α
maximally. (i. e. Match (α, γ) and Match (α, β)).
For (32a), Match′ (α, γ) so Agree (α, γ) is triggered. Because matching is not maximal, the
features that make α active will not be marked for deletion, and the application of Agree
moves us to the situation in (32b). In (32b), a potential defective intervener γ requires Match
(α, γ). We do not have Match (α, γ), so α proceeds to β. We have Match (α, β), so Agree (α,
β) is triggered. This is the annulment of defective intervention effects via maximisation of
matching. Finally, in (32c), γ is again inactive, but now matching between α and γ is
maximal. Thus, we have Match (α, γ) and a defective intervention effect should result. It is
important to be clear, however, that none of the examples considered so far from Chomsky
(1999) concern this possibility, as they are entirely devoted to the interplay between the
situations depicted in (32a) and (32b).
While it appears possible to see the assumptions operative in Chomsky (1999) as
providing a consistent account of the examples he discusses, it is not easy to feel comfortable
with the mechanisms he appears to be committed to. The notion of matching as involving a
conceptually attractive subset relation as in (3ii, 4ii) with the consequence that agreement is a
‘non-distributed’ process should not be given up lightly, and this raises the question as to
whether alternatives to Chomsky’s proposals exist. Re-iterating a point made much earlier, it
is important that any such alternative should seek to remain within the guidelines provided by
                                                     
27 In fact, the stipulation that β matches α maximally in the configurations in (32) is not necessary
if my reconstruction of what Chomsky’s account requires is correct. All that is required is
Match′(α, β), and the only important role for maximisation concerns the relationship between α
and γ. This, in turn, gives rise to a formal difficulty, in that whereas Match′ (α, β) should not
exclude Match (α, β) – we do not wish to illegitimise a remote goal on the grounds that it offers a
maximal match to a probe, we do want Match′ (α, γ) to exclude Match (α, γ) in (32a, b). This is
because only a non-maximally matching, inactive element should be transparent to α’s search for
a goal. This formal difficulty can be overcome by defining MATCH as the disjunction of Match′
and Match and replacing Match by MATCH in each of the second clauses in (32). I shall not
implement this suggestion in the text.  
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the minimalist approach. We have already seen that such alternatives can be contemplated for
(15a, b), so we next consider the issues raised by (26a), repeated as (33):
(33) there are likely to be caught several fish
As far as the expletive is concerned, the natural (Alternative II) assumption is to again
suppose that it enters the derivation at the final stage without movement, so we can focus on
the properties of the participle. Recall that Chomsky supposes that this object has
uninterpretable number, gender and Case features, with the first two being deleted and valued
under agreement with fish. However, the Case feature of PRT is not dealt with in this way, as
at the point at which Agree (PRT, fish) operates, the Case feature of fish has itself not been
valued. The consequence is that Chomsky has to propose mechanisms whereby the Case
features of PRT and fish are valued under distinct tokens of Agree, Agree (T, PRT) and Agree
(T, fish). The complications we have been concerned with above are a direct consequence of
this view that PRT and fish agree in Case only by virtue of each of them agreeing with T. This
contrasts starkly with number and gender agreement between PRT and fish, which is ‘direct.’ 
We can perhaps make some headway in formulating an alternative approach to such
structures by reflecting on the nature of the operation Agree. Consider a core case,
schematised in (34):
(34) Tfinite … [subject ….      
In such a configuration, the φ-set of T acts as a probe and locates the matching φ-set of subject
as a goal. Agree is triggered and, as regards the uninterpretable Case feature of subject, two
consequences follow. First, it is deleted as far as the narrow syntactic derivation is concerned,
essential for LF-convergence; second it is valued as nominative by some feature of finite T,
this valuation being what is of importance for the phonology.28 It seems natural to suppose,
therefore, that Agree has a dual output, a deleted feature that may remain accessible in the
narrow syntax, and a valued feature that is visible only to the phonology.29 The alternative of
                                                     
28 For the sake of concreteness, we can suppose that there is a morphophonological reflex of
nominative case. If there is not, there will still be valuation of this Case feature under Agree, but
its phonological consequences will not be overt.
29 Another way to think about this is to regard Agree as single-valued, effectively converting an
uninterpretable formal feature into a morphophonological feature. From this perspective, deletion
in the narrow syntax is an all-or-none process, and there is no place for such an intermediate
status as being  ‘marked for deletion.’ I am grateful to Mike Jones for suggesting this way of
looking at things, which strikes me as conceptually attractive. However, I shall not pursue it
further here.
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supposing that a single feature can be simultaneously deleted and valued is not immediately
intelligible. Note further that however feature valuation is annotated, it would appear to
provide an exception to Chomsky’s Inclusiveness Condition, whereby the syntactic
computation is constrained not to introduce new material in the course of its operation. We
might suggest, therefore, that the process of uninterpretable feature valuation, while being a
reflex of syntactic configurations, is properly conceptualised as belonging to the phonology.
Thus, the relevant aspects of a token of Agree operating on the configuration in (34) could be
represented as in (35), where F is the interpretable feature of finite T responsible for the
evaluation of [uCase] as nominative:
(35) Agree 〈[F, uPerson, uNumber], [αPerson, βNumber, uCase]〉 =
〈〈[F, uPerson, uNumber], [αPerson, βNumber, uCase]〉, 
  〈[F, αPerson, βNumber], [αPerson, βNumber, NomCase]〉〉
In (35), the first object in the ordered pair providing the output of Agree remains available to
the syntactic computation; the second is to be regarded as part of the phonology.
With the above in mind, consider the configuration in (27), repeated as (36):
(36) [α PRT [catch [DO several fish]]
Here, the φ-set of PRT acts as a probe and locates the φ-set of fish as a goal. Deletion and
valuation of the φ-features of PRT is a consequence of Agree, but, Chomsky maintains,
deletion and valuation of the Case feature of PRT does not occur, since the Case feature of
fish is not itself valued at this stage of the derivation.30 But note that the ‘standard’ conditions
for deletion of the Case feature of PRT are satisfied, since fish is φ-complete.31 Suppose, then,
that this Case feature is deleted in the narrow syntax. What about its valuation?  Clearly, this
cannot be provided by the Case feature of fish, as Chomsky notes, but, if we are prepared to
locate Case valuation in the phonology, there would appear to be no immediate objection to
identifying the valuation of the Case feature of PRT with the valuation of the Case feature of
                                                     
30 Observe that description of the problem in these terms is suggestive. The ‘natural’ way to view
the Case feature of the participle is as determined by the Case feature of the nominal. But
Chomsky’s account is not consistent with this naturalness.
31 The scare quotes here are intended to indicate that the situation is standard in only one sense. For
core cases of the deletion of Case features, the requirement is that the uninterpretable φ-set of a
probe should be complete in order to delete the Case feature of a matching goal. Here, we are
supposing that a complete, interpretable φ-set of a goal can delete a Case feature in a matching
probe. For discussion of some complexities arising in connection with deletion, once proper
account is taken of probe-goal asymmetries, see Atkinson (2000).
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fish, at a point at which the latter has been determined. There is little point here in speculating
on notations that might achieve this, but the important consequence of this way of looking at
things is that the Case feature of PRT is deleted at the same stage of the syntactic derivation
as are its φ-features. Accordingly, there is no requirement that the φ-set of matrix T in (26a)
should acknowledge PRT as an intermediate goal. At the point at which T enters the
derivation, PRT will be inactive and the only legitimate goal for T’s φ-set will be the φ-set of
fish, an object that meets the conditions on Match set out in (3ii, 4ii). Maximisation is given a
unified and conceptually attractive interpretation with none of the complexities set out in
(32).
4. Concluding Remarks
Returning to the question posed in the introduction regarding the formulations of the MLC in
(3) and (4), I hope that the above discussion has taken some small steps towards making a
case for the version in (4), whereby only an active object, one that is visible to core syntactic
processes, is capable of blocking a matching relation between a probe and potential goal. The
conceptual case for this conclusion is easy to make: if an object is invisible as a goal, then it
should be invisible to the syntax in a quite general way, and subscription to intermediate
states of visibility is to be avoided if at all possible.32 However, Chomsky (1998) presents a
series of empirical observations, suggesting that such an intermediate state is, indeed,
necessary, and I have suggested that none of these examples yields the desired conclusion in a
straightforward way. Necessarily, analysis of these cases has involved speculation about how
Chomsky’s assumptions might be modified so as to not require defective intervention effects,
and while some of these speculations have a modicum of plausibility, e.g. the view of
matching as a relation requiring that probe features be a subset of goal features, the suggestion
that derivationally convergence is what matters for phases, others, most notably the idea that
testing for convergence, by virtue of involving a bounded search, does not guarantee correct
outcomes and that valuation should be regarded as ‘phonological,’ are undoubtedly more
controversial.
                                                     
32 I should point out here that in this paper I have not attempted to defend the general proposition
that once a feature has been deleted, it is invisible to all subsequent syntactic processes. Indeed,
in adopting Chomsky’s view that deleted φ-features of T remain available as potential goals for
merged there and accepting some notion of phase, I have proposed analyses that are inconsistent
with this view (while noting one major difficulty in n10). As far as phases go, the case for their
conceptual attractiveness can stand, irrespective of whether this is supported by arguments
relying on the ‘marked for deletion’ status of features. However, as Chomsky (1998, 13) has
observed, conceptual observations must be supported by empirical argumentation if they are to
carry any weight. It follows that even if the arguments presented here have any force, this will be
only a small step towards establishing the more general proposition regarding the status of
deleted elements.
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Of the proposed modifications, the formulation of the subset requirement between probe
and goal features in (3, 4) is perhaps the least tendentious. As observed already, Chomsky
appears to have never formulated an explicit formulation on the matching relation, but it is
necessary to acknowledge here that Pesetsky and Torrego (2000) do this, and to note that the
condition on matching they propose appears to be not consistent with what has been assumed
throughout this paper. Their condition (ibid., 20) appears in (37):
(37) Match Condition
If a head H enters an Agree relation with a set of phrases K, each syntactic feature
of H must be present on some member of K (not necessarily with the same value,
including value for EPP) (my italics – MA).
In a footnote, they observe (42): ‘The word some is important, since a C bearing uWh and uT
may attract a phrase bearing T that lacks wh (e.g. TP) and may attract a phrase bearing wh that
does not bear T (e.g. how or with whom) – in two distinct operations.’ It would be
inappropriate here to explore the full set of assumptions with which Pesetsky and Torrego are
working. To appreciate the brief discussion that follows, it is merely necessary to note that
they follow Chomsky in supposing that wh-movement is a consequence of an agreement
relation obtaining between an uninterpretable feature of C (they refer to this as uWh rather
than Q) and an interpretable feature of a wh-item. However, they differ from Chomsky in
their assumptions about the mechanisms involving nominative case. Specifically, they
suppose that nominative case is an uninterpretable tense feature (uT) on D, and they further
propose that C contains a token of this uninterpretable feature. Without any attempt at
evaluation, let us simply apply these assumptions in the analysis of (38):
(38) what did Mary buy?
Pesetsky and Torrego follow Chomsky’s analysis as far as TP is concerned. Using their
notation in what should be a transparent way, at the point before C is merged, we have (39):
(39) [[Mary, φ, uT] [[T, φ] [buy [what, Wh]]]]
Here, there has been agreement between the φ-set of T and that of Mary, resulting in the
former being ‘marked for deletion,’ and the raising of Mary. We next merge C to give (40):33
                                                     
33 The notation here is intended to represent the fact that , for Pesetsky and Torrego, EPP is a
feature of a feature. Thus, there are two distinct EPP-features in (40), each requiring movement
into the appropriate local domain in order to be satisfied.
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(40) [C, φ, uT(+EPP), uWh(+EPP)] [[Mary, φ, uT] [[T, φ] [buy [what, Wh]]]]
Now, consider the nature of the probe in C in (40). There are two uninterpretable features, and
one option is to suggest that collectively they constitute a probe {uT(+EPP), uWh(+EPP)}. If
we see this probe as seeking a single goal, it is evident that there is nothing in the domain of C
that satisfies the subset requirement. If, however, we contemplate the set union of T and what,
we see that this includes {T, Wh}, so we can maintain that the subset relation is satisfied
between our probe and the set comprising {T, what}. Thus, given (37), C is free to enter an
Agree relation with this set and the consequences are deletion of uT in C with raising of T to
C, and deletion of uWh with raising of what to Spec, C.34
I would like to offer one observation with respect to this analysis. This concerns the
issue of how we should identify a probe. We have already seen that Chomsky has proposed
that a set of uninterpretable φ-features should be regarded as integral for this purpose (i.e. we
should not regard [uperson], [unumber], etc. as constituting independent probes). But there
doesn’t seem to be any compelling reason to extend this thinking to include other
uninterpretable features, and if we do not do this, the formulation of the Match Condition in
(37) becomes unnecessary. In (40), there are two independent probes, uT(+EPP) and
uWh(+EPP). Each of these seeks a goal set of features that includes itself; the former
identifies {T} in T (more strictly, TP. See n32) and the latter {Wh} in what. All other aspects
of the analysis are preserved, and we do not have to jettison the condition on matching in (3,
4).35
Perhaps the most obvious conceptual reason for harbouring suspicions about the
existence of defective intervention effects is their apparent non-existence in circumstances
where they might be anticipated to play a role. To argue that the attempts in Chomsky (1999)
to account for such ‘defective’ defective intervention effects are not sound, as I have tried to
do in Section 3, is to argue implicitly against the existence of defective intervention effects
themselves. If there are no defective intervention effects, there will be no circumstances in
                                                     
34 In order to account for why T rather than TP is raised, Pesetsky and Torrego formulate (p. 5) a
definition of distance according to which TP and T are equidistant from C. They supplement this
with a stipulation (p. 6) as part of what they refer to as the Head Movement Generalization. This
stipulation is that when a head agrees with a feature of its complement, the head of the
complement is raised rather than the complement itself.
35 I believe that there are also some potentially serious empirical problems with (37) in the context
of some of the analyses in Pesetsky and Torrego’s paper, particularly their account of the that-
omission asymmetry in sentential subjects. Interestingly, much of their discussion in the second
half of the paper requires an interpretation of matching as a relation between a probe and a single
object functioning as a goal. What my observation in the text illustrates is that even if this is the
case, it does not necessarily prejudice their core analyses of subject-object asymmetries in matrix
wh-questions. However, it would take another paper to examine this matter in detail. 
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which we need to account for their non-existence. If, furthermore, it proves possible to
produce minimalist accounts of the structures underwriting these arguments without resorting
to defective intervention at all, the case I have tried to make will be that much stronger. I have
suggested that a juxtaposition of Chomsky’s (1999) Alternative II along with careful
consideration of the nature of Agree may be all that it necessary to deal adequately with the
examples in question, and thereby avoid the complex considerations concerning matching that
Chomsky’s own position seems to demand.   
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